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DEscARTS' psychotherapeutical designs can be derived from his correspondence
with the Bohemian Princess Elizabeth and from hisTreatise ofthePassions, published
in 1649, at the age of53, a few months prior to his death. These psychotherapeutical
designs are closely related to histheory ofthe passions.
Descartes conceived the passions as being caused, upheld and fortified by some
movement ofthe(animal) spirits, whichhebelievedtobethe'mostactiveandquickest
particles oftheblood'convertedinto averysubtleairorwind. Hedefinedthepassions
as cognisings, or feelings, or emotions; in fact, his aim was 'to consider how the
passions of the soul differ from all its other thought.'" He thus stressed and always
maintained the primarily psychical nature ofthe passions, regardless oftheir physical
equipment. Not only did he add 'that they quite specially refer to the soul, in order
to distinguish them from the other feelings which are not so referred-some, such
as odours, sounds, colours, referred to external objects, other, such as hunger, thirst,
pain, referring to ourbody';2heexplicitly statedthatfeelings exist onlyin mythought
('sentiments ... .n'ontaucune existencehorsdemapensie')andthatthey are asdifferent
from the objects as pain is from the shape or the movement of the arrow which
causes it.3 Moreover, since he believed animals to be deprived ofreason and thought,
and since, on the other hand, he could not deny to them the movements ofthe spirits
and the gland, he ascribed to animals no more than the movements of the nerves
and the muscles which, as a rule, accompany the passions. However he denied to
animals the passions themselves, ascribing them solely and unmistakably to beings
endowed with reason and thought.4
The first therapeutical design is embodied in two letters addressed to the Princess
Elizabeth. In his letter of May or June 1645, Descartes confessed that there is only
one remedy which consists in diverting our imagination and our senses as much as
possible and in using only our understanding in considering the enemies, who are
within us and with whom we must live, the 'enemies' evidently being the state of
suffering and the symptoms which the princess must have described in her own letter.
He drew the picture of
* Presented at the 37th annual meeting of the American Assciation of the History ofMdicine,
Washington, D.C., 1 May, 1964.
1 Article 27 ofthe Passions oftheSoul.
' Article 29 ofthe Passions ofthe SouL
Replies to the Sixth Objections.
'Article 50 ofthe Passions oftheSoul.
237Walther Riese
a person who would have an infinity of valid reasons for suffering but who would make every
effort to divert the imagination to such an extent that these reasons would never be an object
of thought, except when a pressing need would arise, and that all other moments be devoted
only to objects capable of bringing contentment and joy ...
Descartes here referred to the self-observation and self-treatment of an early
indisposition which, in spite ofthe physician's poor prognosis, he succeeded in over-
coming, due to his inclination to look at events from the angle that made them seem
most pleasant and to act in such a way that his main satisfaction depended on himself
alone. The statement definitely implied a stoic element despite Descartes' polemic
attitude towards Seneca. In terms of modern psychotherapy, the Cartesian method
emerges as an early design ofautosuggestion or autopersuasion. Being a treatment by
psychical means, it also emerges as a pre-design of a traitement moral though its
target was not mental alienation but inner unrest, distress, and their physical after-
effects. He reaffirmed his recommendations in another letter, addressed to this
same person, July 1647, He then even used terms such as 'strong persuasion' and
'firm belief'. Like Pinel, the authentic originator of 'moral treatment', Descartes left
room for the healing power of nature. Though he approved of diet and exercise,
he still believed that the remedies ofthe soul rank highest among all remedies applied.
The truly psychical nature of his treatment is also conspicuous in article 45 of
The Passions of the Soul.
In order to excite courage and to suppress fear, the will to do so is not sufficient; we have to
bring to mind the reasons, the signs, which suggest to us that the danger is not great, that there
is more security in defense than in flight, that we shall have the glory and joy of having con-
quered, whereas we can expect nothing but regret and shame from having fled . . .
In article 211 of The Passions ofthe Soul he finally formulated this design as 'the
general remedy' against the passions.
When the passions urge us only towards things the execution of which necessitates some delay,
we ought to abstain from pronouncing any judgment on the spot, and to divert ourselves by
other thoughts until time and rest shall have entirely calmed the emotion which is in the blood.
And finally, when it incites us to actions regarding which it is requisite that an immediate reso-
lution should be taken, the will must make it its main business to consider and follow up the
reasons which are contrary to those set up by the passions, although they appear to be less
strong ... .6
This text appears to be an amplification of article 46 of the same treatise:
There is one special reason why the soul is unable to change or suppress its passions in an
effortless manner [promptement] and this reason is what has led me, in defining them, to say
that they are not merely caused, but also upheld and fortified by some particular movement of
the [animal] spirits. They are almost all accompanied by some excitation [de quelque6motion]
taking placein the heart, and consequently alsoin allthe blood and [animal] spirits, so that until
this commotion has subsided, thepassions remain present to our thought in the same manner as
sensible objects are present to us in thought during the time they act on our sense-organs. Just
as the soul, in making itselfclosely attentive to some otherthing, can preventitselffrom hearing
aslightnoiseorfeelingaslightpain,butcannotthe samewayescapehearingthunderorfeelingfire
burning the hand, it is similarly easy to overcome the lesser passions, but not those that are
more violent and powerful; we have to await the abating of the commotion in the blood and
6 Descartes Selections, ed. Ralph Eaton, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927, pp. 401-403.
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spirits. The most the will can do while this commotion is in its full strength, is to refuse consent
to itseffects, and to restrain several ofthe movements in which it disposes the body. For instance,
if anger causes the hand to be upraised for striking, the will can usually arrest it [from further
action); iffear incites the legs toffight, thewill can restrain them, and so in all other like cases.6
Common to all these texts is the disbelief in an immediate and direct suppression
ofthepassions,thevarious movements accompanying them andthebeliefinthedelay-
ing and diverting thoughts and movements. Thus took shape a psychotherapeutical
design7 which did neither deny the first principles of a philosophy seeing in man
primarily a thinking being, nor the point of departure of its author trusting to have
reached firm grounds only when he had retreated to his conscious thinking and
doubting self as the only remaining and unshakable ground. The twentieth-century
reader trained in the science and power of the unconscious, may be reluctant to
accept the efficacy of Descartes' method; but he will not remain unimpressed by the
innercoherenceofthesamethoughtnolesspalpableinDescartes'theoryofknowledge
than in its practical consequences and applications.8
Theconclusion seemsinescapable thatultimately in Descartes' thought the passions
andthe movements excitingtheminthe brainremainedtwoirreducible termsbringing
home to the reader the Cartesian fundamental and indissoluble distinction between
mind and body.
Thisdistinctionbetweenthe movementsandthepassionsexcitedbythem,reappears
in another therapeutical design in which Descartes anticipated the methods and
results of a now self-sufficient branch of experimental neurophysiology which took
shape more than two hundred years after his lifetime, i.e. the conditioned reflexes.
Each movement ofthe gland, he said in article 44 ofThe Passions ofthe Soul, seems
to have been naturally joined from our earliest years to some one of our thoughts;
we can nonetheless by habituation join it with another. Though the movements
which represent certain objects to the soul, are naturally connected with these which
excite in it certain passions, they can, by habituation, be separated from them and
joined with other very different passions. Although animals lack reason, and perhaps
thought ofany kind, all the movements ofthe spirits ofthe gland, which in us excite
the passions, are none the less in them. They serve to maintain and fortify not, as in
humans, the passions, but the movements of the nerves and muscles which custo-
marilyaccompanythem. Hebelievedtheseconsiderations to behelpfulin encouraging
us to practise watchfulness in respect of our passions. He maintained that since we
6 Dscates' Philosophical Writings selected and translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London,
Macmillan, 1952, pp. 300-301.
7 On the other hand, one may also see in the Cartesian union and apparent fusion of mind and
body, the prerequisite for the therapeutical effects ofphysical agents likely to reach the soul. '. . .
I am not only lodged in my body as apilot in a vessel, but ... I am besides so intimately conjoined,
and as it were inter-mixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity'. The Meditations
and Selections from the Principles ofRene Descartes, translated by John Veitch, Open Court Pub-
lishing House, Illinois, 1945, p. 94.
8 Delay as a therapeutical device appears for the first time in Seneca's moral essay On Anger;
the crucial passage reads as follows: '. . . The cause of anger is an impression ofinjury, and to this
we should not easily give credence. We ought not to be led to it quickly even by open and evident
acts; for some things are false that have the appearance of truth. We should always allow some
time; a daydiscloses the truth'. The method to delay action in a stateof anger reappears inDacier's
biography of Plutarch (A.D. 46-120). Again, the method is illustrated by the angry master setting
out to punish a slave who has committed a fault. Andre DACIER, Les vies des hommes illustres
pour servir de supplement aux vies de Plutarque, Nouvelle 6dition, Paris, 1803, tome 12, An XI.
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can with some little address and sklfl change the movements ofthe brain in animals
devoid ofreason, manifestly we can do so still more effectively in the case ofmen.9,'0
Descartes declared allpassionstobegoodbynature('toutesbonnesdeleurnature':
art. 211 ofThe Passions ofthe Soul) and that one should only avoid their wrong use
or excess. Similarly, he understood that 'the utility ofall the passions wholly consists
intheirmanner offortifyingandprolonginginthesoulthethoughtswhichitisgoodit
should conserve, and which lacking their support, might readily have been effaced
from it. On the other hand all the harm they can cause consists in their fortifying
and conserving these thoughts beyond what is required, or in their fortifying and
conserving others on which it is not good to dwell'."l In other words, Descartes
conceived the passions as instrumentalin human life, thought, and conduct.
Descartes was not satisfied with the instrumental role of the passions in general
and abstractterms; hedescribedindetail andinconcrete termstheutility ofanumber
of them. He thus offered a teleological interpretation of pain as a warning against
imminent physical harm. It excites in the soul the passion of sadness (tristesse),
succeeded in its turn by that of hatred (haine) of the cause of pain and finally the
desire to get rid of it. Similarly, the passion ofjoy succeeds the feeling oftitillation
(chatouillement) by which the soul is informed about the things beneficial to the
body; then the passion oflove (presumably ofthe cause) originates, succeeded in its
turn by the desire to obtain the cause ofthe feeling oftitillation.
But Descartes did not apply the instrumental function of the passions to a more
specific therapeutical design as he did when recommending to the Princess Elizabeth
other significant constituents of his doctrine, above all, the primacy of soul and
thought as methods of treating mental distress and even physical ailments. The
reason for not using the passions therapeutically might have been lack of similar
personal contacts and problems resulting from individual distress such as were
conveyed to him by his intelligent and distinguished correspondent, who asked for
advice and assistance. Were this true he would neither have been the first nor the
last author to owe the development and elaboration of his thesis to opportunity
and request.
In spite of their inner coherence and its scope, Descartes' therapeutical designs
contain certain presuppositions andcaptiouselementswhichmust be denounced. The
design presupposes the union ofbody and mind. The notion of this union was con-
sidered by Descartes as one of the few 'primary notions' which are, as it were, the
originals on the pattern of which we form the rest of our knowledge (letter to
Elizabeth of 31 March 1643). But the notion implies a seat ofthe soul in the pineal
gland as the area in which the union takes place. This doctrine was denounced as
ambiguous at an early hour (by Gassendi). I have myself emphasized its most pre-
carious and equivocal naturewhenever I havediscussed the history andthe principles
9 Dcartes' Philosophical writings selected and translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London,
Macmillan, 1952, pp. 304-305. ll W. Riese, 'Descartes's ideas of brain function', The history and philosophy ofknowledge of the
brain and itsfunctions, ed. F. N. L. Poynter, Oxford, Blackwell, 1958, pp. 115-134.
Article 74 ofThe Passions ofthe Soul.
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ofcerebral localization.12
The second precarious presupposition implied in Descartes' therapeutical designs
is that of the 'animal spirits' by the intervention of which the action of the soul
reaches the bodily organs. The conception of the animal spirits carries the same
ambiguity as that of the seat of the soul. Though the 'spirits' are conceived by
Descartes as invisible, they are still conceived by him as corporeal and it is precisely
their corporeal nature which makes them unfit for serving as intermediary between
soul and body. No matter (res extensa) can serve as seat or carrier ofthought which
by definition is understood by Descartes to be unextended.
The third and the most precarious constituent of Descartes' therapeutical designs
is to be found in his 'general remedy against the passions'.13 He placed among the
remedies 'the forethought and diligence whereby we can correct our natural faults
in exercising ourselves in separating within us the movements of the blood and
spirits from the thoughts to which they are usually united'. But do we really sense
these movements? Can we separate from thought neurophysiological processes
which we do not sense? Descartes here reiterated the same thesis on which he con-
structed his theory ofvision, namely that the soul perceives onlyin so far as it is in
the brain. Descartes' theory ofthe passions cannot be understood unless we under-
stand his theory ofvision; and his theory ofvision cannot be understood unless we
understand the basic tenets of authentic Cartesianism.
Descartes finally declared that 'the most general remedy and the most easy to
practise against all excesses ofthe passions is that, when we feel our blood to be thus
agitated, we should be warned ofthe fact, and recollect that all that presents before
the imagination tends to delude the soul and causes the reasons which serve to urge
it to accomplish the object of its passion to appear much stronger than they are,
and those which serve to dissuade it to be much weaker.'14 No passage in the whole
treatise, ifnot in the Cartesian texts atlarge, seems to bring home to the reader with
greater force the general significance ofCartesianism for the mastery ofthe passions,
and thus for Cartesian ethics. In this passage the philosopher, once more, turns to
reason and sound judgment as the ultimate criteria and moving principles of moral
conduct.
Butgrantedthat attheheight ofthepassions, when animmediate resolution should
be taken, we are able to consider 'the reasons which are contrary to those set up by
the passions, although they appear to be less strong'-does it follow that we are
always able to follow these reasons under the circumstances and to act according to
these reasons? Dothese reasonshaveinthemselves movingpower? Isinsightsufficient
to set into motion those instrumentalities by means of which we act according to
insight? Does the one who knows how he should act, necessarily act accordingly?
12W. Riese,Prcipkesofneurology in thelight ofhistoryandtheirpresent use, Nervous and Mental
Disease Monographs No. 80, New York, 1950.
W. Riese, History ofNeurology, M. D. Publications Inc., New York, 1959.
W. Riese and E. C. Hoff, 'A history ofthe doctrim ofcerebral localization, sources, anticipations
and basic reasoning', J. Hist. Med., 1950, 1, 50-71.
W. Riew and E. C. Hoff, 'A history of the doctrine of cerebral localization'. Part II: Methods
and Main Results', J. Hist. Med., 1951, 6, 439-70. 13Article 211 ofThePassions ofthe Soul. 14bc. cit
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In this most crucial area of his moral doctrine Descartes' thought again became
neurophysiological. But granted thatthe soul by willing makes the small gland move,
the question at stake is precisely that ofan intelligible explanation ofthis mysterious
moving power of the soul which is simply stated in neurophysiological terms, but
not answered. When trying to master the reality andliving experience ofthe passions,
we are thus compelled to fall back to Descartes' purely speculative design of brain
structure and brain function. The alarming dialectic between reason and passion
persists in all its strength. It appears that man striving for decision, is left with
Descartes' imaginary neuroanatomical and neurophysiological knowledge, which
did not stand the tests of observation and experimentation. But can we in fairness
expect that the road to the mastery ofthe passions, and thus to moral principles and
conduct, leadsthroughneuroanatomyandneurophysiology? Does a betterknowledge
in these sciences provide for a better resistance against the threatening power of the
passions? Here ends the contribution of Descartes as a psychotherapist, and here
begins the problem of his twentieth-century reader.
Two LETrERS FROM DESCARTES TO THE PRINCESS ELIZABETH
Egmond, May or June, 1645
Madame,
I could not read the letter which your Highness did me the great honour of
writing to me, without being intensely moved by the fact that so rare and so accom-
plished a virtue should not be accompanied by health or the prosperity it deserves;
and I can well understand the multitude of sufferings encountered and which are all
the more difficult to overcome because true reason does not command that they be
opposed directly and driven out. These enemies are within us and we must live with
them, and thus we must always guard ourselves against them to prevent them from
causing usharm; and there isonlyoneremedywhichconsists indiverting ourimagina-
tion and our senses as much as possible and to use only our understanding in con-
sidering these enemies, when prudence itselfobliges us to do so.
In this particular case I feel that it is easy to notice the difference which exists
between the understanding and the imagination and the senses; for this difference is
such, I believe, that a person who would have every reason to be happy, but who
would be continually shown tragedies whose every act would be ominous, a person
whose sole occupation would be the consideration of objects of sadness and pity
known to be ficticious and fabulous, so that the only result would be to bring tears
and move the imagination without touching the understanding, I believe that that
only would suffice to accustom the heart to anguish and to sighs. As a result, the
circulation of the blood would be retarded and slowed down, the grossest parts of
the blood, adhering one to the other, could easily obstruct the spleen, by getting
caught andstopping in the pores; and the most subtle parts, retainingtheir agitation,
could alter the lung and cause a cough which ultimately might prove dangerous. On
the contrary, a person who would have an infinity ofvalid reasons for suffering, but
who would make every effort to divert the imagination to such an extent that these
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reasons would never be an object of thought except when a pressing need would
arise, and that all other moments be devoted only to objects capable of bringing
contentment andjoy, such aperson notonlywouldfindthis conductusefulinjudging
more sanely matters ofimportance, which would thus be regarded without passion,
but doubtlessly would find that this conduct by itself would be capable ofrestoring
health even though the spleen and the lung would be in a poor condition on account
ofthe bad temperament of the blood which is caused by sadness. It would be even
better if her Highness used also medical remedies in order to dissolve that part of
thebloodwhichcauses obstruction. TothateffectIjudgethatthewaters ofSpawould
be indicated, especially ifyour Highness observes while taking them what physicians
are accustomed to recommend, that is to rid the mind completely of all manner of
sad thoughts and even of all types of serious meditation related to the sciences. I
should advise your Highness to imitate those who while looking at the greenness of
a forest, the colours ofa flower, the flight of a bird, and whatever spectacles require
no attention, persuade themselves that they are thinking of nothing whatever. And
that would not be wasting time, but making good use ofit; for in so doing, we have
the satisfaction of hoping that by this means we shall recover perfect health which is
the foundation of all the other blessings, which we can have in this life.
I am aware that what I have written here is even better known to your Highness
than to myself and that it is less theory than practice which causes difficulties in the
situation. However, the extreme favour which your Highness has bestowed upon me
ofbeing interested in my opinion, emboldens me to write it down such as itis. More-
over, I take the liberty ofadding that I have myselfexperienced that a nearly similar,
and even more dangerous, disease which I had contracted, was cured by the remedy
whichIhavejustdescribed. For, as I havebeenborn ofamother, who died afewdays
after my birth ofa lung disease caused by grief, I had inherited from her a dry cough
as well as a pale complexion, whichlasted beyond my 20thbirthday, and which made
all the physicians who examined me before that date condemn me to an early death.
But I believe that the inclination to look at events from the angle that made them
seem most pleasant and to act in such a way that my main satisfaction depended
on myself alone, is the reason why this indisposition, which was natural to me, has
little by little vanished from my system.
I am very much obliged to your Highness for having been so kind as to express
her opinion concerning Sir Digby's book, which I shall not be capable of reading
until it has been translated into Latin. I have been told by Mister Jonsson, who was
hereyesterday, that severalpeoplewish to do so. He also told me that I could address
my letters to your Highness by ordinary messengers, a thing I would not have dared
to do without his advice, and I had even put offwriting this one because I had been
waiting for one of my friends to go to the Hague and take it with him. I greatly
regret the absence ofMonsieur de Pollot because I could have learned from him the
state ofyour health; but the letters that are sentfor me tothemessengers ofAlkmaar
never failed to reach me, and as there is nothing in the world that I desire with more
passion than to be of service to your Highness, nothing can make me happier than
the honour ofreceiving her orders.
I am, etc.
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Paris, July 1647
Madame,
My trip could not have been troubled by any misfortune, for I had the great happi-
ness during myvoyage ofremaining inyourHighnesses thoughts; that most gratifying
letter which bears witness to this fact is the most precious object that I could possibly
receive in this country. And it would have made me completely happy had it not
informed me that the disease from which your Highness was suffering before I left
the Hague had left some traces of stomach discomfort. The remedies which your
Highness chose, i.e., diet and exercise, constitute in my opinion the best possible
after the remedies of the soul, which undoubtedly has great power over the body,
as is shown by the great changes that anger, fear and other passions excite. But it
is not directly by its volition that the soul leads the (animal) spirits in the places
where they can be useful or harmful; it is only by willing or by thinking ofsomething
else. For the structure of our body is such that certain movements naturally follow
certain thoughts; as we see that blushing follows shame, tears compassion, and
laughter joy. And I cannot think of any thought more suited to the conservation of
health than a strong persuasion and a firm beliefthat the architecture of our bodies
is so good that once we are healthy we cannot easilyfall sick, unless we have indulged
to excess or else the air or other external causes have done us harm. And if we do
suffer from a disease, we can easily recover by the sole force of nature, especially
when we are still young. This persuasion is without doubt much more true and
reasonable thanthat ofcertainpeoplewho, onthereportofanastrologer orphysician,
make themselves believe that they must die at a given date, and by that alone become
ill and even in frequent cases succumb, as I have seen it happen to several persons.
But I would not fail to become extremely sad if I thought that your Highness was
still indisposed; I prefer to hope that health is restored; and yet, my desire to be
reassured makes me extremely eager to return to Holland. I expect to leave in 4 or
5 days for Poitou and Brittany where I have business to transact; but as soon as this
is settled I firmly hope to return to those happy places where I had the honour of
conversing a few times with your Highness. Although there are many people here
whom I honour and esteem, I have found nobody who could make me stay. And
I am, beyond anything that I can say, etc.
This first English translation of the two letters by Descartes to Elizabeth was made by W. Riese,
M.D., with Professor J. Hubert (University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles). The edition from which the
text of the letters is quoted is that of the Bibliothbque de la Pl6iade: Descartes, Oeuvres et Lettres,
textes pr6sent6s par Andr6 Bridoux, Paris, Librairie Gallimard, 1952, letter of May 1645, p. 1186;
letter ofJuly 1647, p. 1280.
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